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The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
North Carolina Revisited
In 1974, the North Carolina Supreme Court heralded an end to
the archaic application of the doctrine of caveat emptor and recog-
nized an implied warranty of habitability2 in the sale of new homes by
builder-vendors.3 The decision signaled North Carolina's adoption of
what has become the majority viewpoint,4 and subsequent opinions by
the North Carolina courts have demonstrated a committment to that
rule.' The North Carolina warranty, however, is still in only its most
basic formulation. While other jurisdictions have confronted many of
the complex ancillary issues that inevitably surface in an application of
the warranty,6 North Carolina has considered only a few. An exami-
nation of the historical development of the warranty in the United
States, recent North Carolina decisions, and the developing trend in
other jurisdictions demonstrates the need for a revised formulation of
the warranty designed to enhance the protection currently afforded new
and used home buyers in North Carolina.
The doctrine of caveat emptor dominated sales of real property in
the United States and England well into the twentieth century. As late
as 1931, no court had repudiated the caveat emptor protection of the
seller of realty.8 The doctrine was premised on the supposed arm's
length negotiation and equal bargaining position between vendor and
1. "Let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
2. The implied warranty of habitability is simply a warranty, by operation of law, that a
home has been built with workmanlike construction. See Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 61, 209
S.E.2d 776, 784 (1974).
3. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
4. Thirty-five states have accepted the warranty by case law. The overwhelming trend has
been to discard caveat emptor principles in favor of some protection for the purchaser. Annot., 25
A.L.R.3d 383 (1969 & Supp. 1978). See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies/for the Purchase of
a Defective Home, 49 J. Un. L. 533, 549 (1971).
5. Griffin v. Wheller-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (water in crawl-
space); Earls v. Link, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 204, 247 S.E.2d 617 (1978) (defective fireplace and chim-
ney); Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976) (adequate and usable water from
well). See also Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) (implied warranty for
restrictive covenant); Jones v. Clark, 36 N.C. App. 327, 244 S.E.2d 183 (1978) (implied warranty
does not require one to be in privity); Dawson Indus. v. Godley Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 270,
224 S.E.2d 266, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976) (implied warranty does not
extend to commercial structures).
6. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969 & Supp. 1978).
7. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text infra.
8. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent lAssaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L.
REv. 541, 542-43 (1961). See also Hamilton, The Anient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
1133 (1931); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 391 (1969); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 440 (1959).
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purchaser.' The assumption was that the purchaser had both the re-
sources to adequately inspect a dwelling for defects"0 and the ability to
obtain an express warranty from the seller for whatever further protec-
tion he desired." Such reasoning, however, came under heavy criti-
cism during the post-World War II building boom that gave rise to the
now common practice of mass producing homes, with the lot and house
then sold in a package deal. The former notion of the builder as an
artisan, amenable to supervision by the individual who owned the
homesite, was outmoded by the onslaught of heavy machinery and pre-
fabricated development houses.' 2
The changes initiated by the modem approach to production
made greater protection for the buyer a necessity. No longer could one
assume the existence of a sophisticated purchaser with a bargaining po-
sition equal to that of the vendor. Today's buyer is most likely
purchasing a home for the first time and, in making what is probably
the most important transaction of his or her lifetime, generally relies on
the skill of the builder.1' As a result of the inequities surrounding the
continued application of the rule of caveat emptor to modem realty
practices, the implied warranty of habitability was developed. 14
The warranty was first recognized, in an embryonic state, in the
English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd."' Confronting the
9. Bixby, supra note 4, at 549.
10. When the doctrine developed, the typical purchaser was a middle class buyer who em-
ployed an architect to design a house for his previously acquired lot. The architect was able to
supervise the construction. Further control was assured by the practice of making progress pay-
ments only for work completed satisfactorily. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
11. See Haskell, The Casefor an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales ofReal Propery, 53
GEO. L.J. 633, 642 (1965).
12. Roberts, supra note 10, at 542.
13. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 325-26 (N.J. 1965), the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model ... he clearly
relies on the skill of the developer and on its implied representation that the house will
be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation.
He has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he has no real competency
to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in the nature of things, largely superfi-
cial, and his opportunity for obtaining meaningful protective changes in the conveyanc-
ing documents prepared by the builder-vendor is negligible .... Buyers of mass
produced development homes are not on an equal footing with the builder vendors and
are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than are automobile purchasers in a
position to protect themselves in the bill of sale.
14. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 69, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966), the court stated: "To
apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily
engaged in the business of building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of justice."
15. [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
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unique question whether an unfinished house was subject to the rigid
rule of caveat emptor, the Miller court recognized that, in the purchase
of a house under construction, the builder impliedly warranted that the
house would be built in an efficient and workmanlike manner, of
proper material, and would be fit for habitation when finished. 16 The
court reasoned that in the purchase of an unfinished house the builder
was obviously aware that his buyer intended to live in the house and,
therefore, impliedly warranted that it would be suitable for that pur-
pose.17 In addition, since the contract was signed before the dwelling
was completed, the buyer must have relied on the skill of the builder,
having no personal opportunity to inspect for defects. 8 The 1957 deci-
sion in Vanderschrier v. Aaron'9 marked the first application of the
Miller rule in the United States. In Vanderschrier, a decision dealing
with the purchase of a house under construction, the Ohio Court of
Appeals recognized an implied warranty of habitability but declared its
continued adherence to caveat emptor when a completed home was in-
volved2
The distinction drawn by the Miller and Vanderschrier courts be-
tween a finished and unfinished house was vigorously challenged.2'
Those cases had turned on the assumption that a purchaser of a com-
pleted house has the ability to inspect for defects. Such a distinction,
however, was regarded by many as artificial because very few purchas-
ers possess either the competence to inspect a house themselves or the
means to hire a skilled inspector. It was also pointed out that when a
home is completed it becomes more difficult to inspect for certain de-
fects such as those hidden in the foundation.22 In 1964, the Colorado
Supreme Court responded to these criticisms in Carpenter v. Donohoe23
and held that an implied warranty extended to a completed house.24
16. Id. at 113 (dictum).
17. Id.
18. The rationale of Miller was later extended by the English courts to the sale of a substan-
tially completed house. Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 769 (Q.B.).
19. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
20. Id. at 343, 140 N.E.2d at 821. The Vanderschrier decision was cited with approval as
numerous other jurisdictions recognized a limited warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Glisan v.
Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d
383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Loraso v. Custom Built Homes, Inc., 144 So. 2d 459 (La. 1962); Jones
v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329
P.2d 474 (1958).
21. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 4, at 556; Bearman, supra note 8.
22. Bearman, supra note 8, at 545.
23. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
24. Id. at 79, 388 P.2d at 400. In Carpenter, the purchasers sought damages for fraud and for
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The Carpenter decision led other jurisdictions to reject the Miller rule
and recognize an implied warranty regardless of the stage of a houses's
construction.
North Carolina's adoption of the implied warranty of habitability
was the product of a gradual recognition of a distinction between land
sales and home sales and acknowledgment of the buyer's inability to
adequately inspect for defects in the latter.26 The early cases in which
purchasers alleged breach of an implied warranty generally involved
sales of land, and the courts rigidly adhered to caveat emptor concepts
in the absence of fraud. Typical of those cases is Etheridge v.
Vernoy,2 8 a decision involving an alleged deficiency between the
number of acres of land actually conveyed in a sale and the number
supposedly purchased under the deed.29 The North Carolina Supreme
Court held:
The maxim of caveat emptor is a rule of the common law, and ap-
plies as well to contracts of purchase of real as personal property, and
is adhered to in courts of equity as well as of law, in the absence of
breach of warranty, express or implied, in the sale of a completed house. Within months of its
occupation by the purchasers, the walls of the house began to crack and had to be reinforced with
heavy lumber. Although the court decided for the purchaser on a fraud theory, it discussed the
distinctions previously made in warranty cases between completed homes and homes under con-
struction and reached the following conclusion:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near completion
than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongrous. To say that the
former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recognizing a distinction
without a reasonable basis for it.
Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
25. E.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Crawley v. Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (rex. 1968); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457
P.2d 199 (1969).
26. Note, Real Propery-Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina, I I WAKE FoR-
EST L. REv. 155, 156 (1975).
27. See Walsh v. Hall; 66 N.C. 233, 235 (1872). See also Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757,
36 S.E. 153 (1900); Credle v. Swindell, 63 N.C. 305 (1869); Lytle v. Bird, 48 N.C. 222 (1855);
Saunders v. Hatterman, 24 N.C. 32 (1841); Fagan v. Newson, 12 N.C. 20 (1826).
As late as 1967, North Carolina courts continued strict application of caveat emptor in reaty
sales. For example, in Walton v. Cagle, 269 N.C. 177, 152 S.E.2d 312 (1967), the purchaser re-
fused to conclude a sale because of a dispute regarding boundaries and access to the land. The
court reiterated its commitment to caveat emptor in the sale of real property and denied relief
absent a showing of fraud.
In Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975), however, a decision unique to the
entire country, the court retreated from its previous rigidity and held that a landowner selling
realty encumbered by a restrictive convenant impliedly warrants that it will be useable for the
purpose to which it is specifically limited by the convenant. For a discussion of the Hinson case,
see Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty: Seller of Land Limited by Restrictive Covenants Im-
plidtly Warrants That the Land was Usablefor the Restricted Purose, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1097 (1976).
28. 70 N.C. 713 (1874).
29. Id. at 724.
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fraud. The purchaser's only right of relief is to be found in the cove-
nants in his deed where there is no fraud.30
Application of caveat emptor to the sale of land, in which any de-
fect is usually apparent upon routine inspection, is generally reason-
able. When home sales are involved, however, latent defects often
make inspections meaningless.3' Recognition of this distinction laid
the foundation for the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Hartley v. Ballou32 to adopt an implied warranty in home sales.
The 1974 Hartley decision involved the purchase of a lot and
newly finished home for use as a residence. Within weeks after occupa-
tion, the basement of the house flooded due to defects in the founda-
tion.33 The builder's efforts at repair brought temporary relief, but
eighteen months later the basement flooded during a hurricane and
again one month later after a heavy rain.34 The owner brought an ac-
tion to recover damages.3 5 The trial court entered a judgement for the
owner on an implied warranty theory and its decision was upheld by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals.36 The supreme court reversed on
other grounds'but sustained the holding of the court of appeals with
30. Id.
31. Note, supra note 26, at 158.
32. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The North Carolina Supreme Court's decisions in
Moss v. Best Knitting Mills, 190 N.C. 644, 130 S.E. 635 (1925) and Cantrell v. Woodhill Enter-
prises, Inc., 273 N.C. 490, 160 S.E.2d 476 (1968) paved the way for Hartley. In Moss, plaintiff-
contractor sued for the balance due on a contract to construct an addition to defendant's mill.
Defendant counterclaimed for damages, alleging that faulty construction of the roof permitted
leakage that damaged defendant's equipment. The court affirmed the trial court's finding for
plaintiff because of defendant's active role in site selection and his opportunity to observe the
construction. In so doing, however, the court articulated the builder's duty:
It is the duty of the builder to perform his work in a proper and workmanlike manner.
This means that the work shall be done in an ordinarily skillful manner, as a skilled
workman should do it. There is an implied agreement such skill as is customary will be
used. In order to meet this requirement the law exacts ordinary care and skill only.
Manner of best builders are not required in absence of specifications.
190 N.C. at 648, 130 S.E. at 637 (citations omitted).
In Cantrell, the purchaser of a home contended that the builder failed to construct his house
in a workmanlike manner, specifically alleging defects in landscape work and subflooring. The
court dismissed the allegations regarding the landscape work, reasoning that the purchasers had
accepted the property and all defects discoverable by inspection. The problem with the subfloor-
ing, however, was held to be a latent defect and the court intimated that the contractor was liable
for any defect not discoverable through reasonable inspection. The court stated that "[i]t is the
duty of every contractor or builder to perform his work in a proper and workmanlike manner, and
he impliedly represents that he possesses the skill necessary to do the job he has undertaken." 273
N.C. at 497, 160 S.E.2d at 481.
33. 286 N.C. at 55-57, 209 S.E.2d at 778-80.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 20 N.C. App. 493, 201 S.E.2d 712 (1974).
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respect to the implied warranty issue.37
As recognized in Hartley, an implied warranty will be found only
if the structure in question is a house, the house is new, 38 and the sale is
by a vendor in the business of building such dwellings.39 If applicable,
the warranty (1) provides a guarantee of workmanlike construction,40
covering major structural defects of the dwelling and its fixtures; 4t (2)
applies only to the initial vendee;42 (3) begins to run when the deed is
passed to the buyer or the buyer takes possession, whichever occurs
first;43 (4) is not extinguished by the doctrine of merger by deed;44 and
(5) does not extend to defects that are visible or reasonably should be
visible to a person making an inspection of the dwelling.45
Since Hartley, North Carolina appellate courts have considered
five applications of the implied warranty. 46 Although these decisions
37. 286 N.C. at 66, 209 S.E.2d at 785.
38. The status of the house relative to completion is irrelevant. Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
See also notes 116-20 and accompanying text supra.
39. Id. This individual is referred to as a "builder-vendor." In the usual case, a builder-
vendor is a builder who both builds and sells a house that he owns. The term has been used,
however, in various ways to attach liability to a seller who is within the spirit of the definition of
builder-vendor. It appears that liability will attach when an individual acts in either of two capac-
ities: (I) As a vendor, when he either built the home or owns the home but hired another to
construct it; or (2) As a builder, when he either sells the home himself or hires another to sell it for
him. Thus, the requirement of a builder-vendor cannot be circumvented merely by a separation
of the builder and vendor functions when, in fact, the same individual controls each role. A real
estate broker is not within the definition of builder-vendor and is not liable under the implied
warranty. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093,449 S.W.2d 992 (1970); Bethlamy v. Bechel, 91 Idaho
55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Elmore v. Blume, 31 IL. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975); Elederkin v.
Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 711 (1972); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), The
North Carolina courts have not confronted a specific builder-vendor problem. The Hartley court,
however, held that liability for a warranty breach will attach to any vendor "in the business of
building. . . dwellings." 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
40. Various terms have been used in other jurisdictions to define this aspect of the warranty.
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) (workmanlike manner of
construction); Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (fitness and merchantability); Bethlamy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (habitability); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d
300 (1972) (fitness for habitation). The differences in phraseology have not led to any substantive
differences in the disposition of a case, and it seems fair to regard the terms as interchangeable.
41. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The Hartley court rejected the doctrine of merger, which operates to incorporate a
contract of sale into a deed, leaving the deed as the only controlling instrument, in the context of
an action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Thus, the delivery of the deed will
not prohibit action on unfulfilled promises in the contract. For a discussion of the merger doctrine
in this context, see Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
45. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
46. Earls v. Link, Inc. 38 N.C. App. 204,247 S.E.2d 617 (1978); Jones v. Clark, 36 N.C. App.
327, 244 S.E.2d 183 (1978); Dawson Indus. v. Godley Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 270, 224 S.E.2d
266, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976); Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221
S.E.2d 727 (1976); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
HABITABILITY REVISITED
have not significantly altered the warranty as originally defined, they
indicate the willingness of the North Carolina courts to strengthen the
rule and apply it with flexibility.41
In Lyon v. Ward,48 the court of appeals held that a builder-vendor
impliedly warranted to the initial vendee that a well, constructed on the
property and sold as an integral part of the house, would provide an
adequate, usable water supply. In so doing the court recognized that a
fixture that is integrally related to a dwelling does not have to be physi-
cally part of the house to benefit from the warranty. The holding
demonstrated the court's recognition of a contract for the purchase of a
home as a kind of "housing package", inclusive of all structures that
enable a homeowner to gain maximum benefit from his living area.
The court in a subsequent case, Earls v. Link, Inc. ,'49 adopted this rea-
soning and held a defective chimney to be within the warranty protec-
tion of the Hartley rule.
The Earls court was also faced with the problem of determining
the statute of limitations period applicable to a latent defect in the sale
of a new home, an issue left open by the Hartley decision.5 0 The home-
owner in Earls had purchased his residence in June 1971 but did not
use his fireplace until early 1974, at which time a defect was discovered.
The builder-vendor contended that the owner's action, filed in Novem-
ber of 1976, was barred by a three-year statute of limitations covering
general obligations derived from a contract,-5 while the homeowner
suggested that a six-year statute of limitations dealing with improve-
ments to real property was applicable.52 The court, however, rejected
both arguments and held that under G.S. 1-15(b)53 an action on an
47. Two of the five cases are only peripherally relevant to this discussion because they do not
deal with the sale of a home. In Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975), the
court recognized an implied warranty for lands covered by restrictive covenants. Regarded as an
extension of Hartley v. Ballou concepts, this case of first impression is without precedent in any
other jurisdiction. See Note, note 27 supra.
In Dawson Indus. v. Godley Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 270,244 S.E.2d 266, cert. denied, 290
N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976), the court refused to extend the implied warranty to work on a
commercial structure.
48. 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976).
49. 38 N.C. App. 204, 247 S.E.2d 617 (1978).
50. Id. at 207-08, 247 S.E.2d at 619.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1) (Curn. Supp. 1979).
52. See id. § 1-50 (5) (1969).
53. Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1157, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1706 (previously codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (repealed 1979)) provided:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for
wrongful death or one for malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to
perform professional services, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person
1980] 1061
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implied warranty of habitability does not accrue until the defect is dis-
covered or reasonably should have been discovered, assuming the suit
is filed within ten years from the last act giving rise to a claim for re-
lief.54 The decision broadened the reach of the warranty by recogniz-
ing that the inherent difficulty in discovering certain defects during the
early life of a new house should not act as an arbitrary constraint on an
action by the purchaser.5
Perhaps the most far-reaching application of implied warranty
concepts by a North Carolina court is found in Grin v. Wheeler-Leo-
nard & Co. 5 6 Plaintiff-purchasers alleged that poor waterproofing al-
lowed standing water in a crawlspace and that defects in the foundation
resulted in puddling beneath the house.5 7 The supreme court held that
the trial court erred in refusing to present the breach of implied war-
ranty claim to the jury, stressing that damages were recoverable for
defective workmanship even though the house itself was "livable. '58
This holding is especially significant in light of recent rulings in other
jurisdictions that require a home to be unlivable for recovery of dam-
ages. 59
Although the decisions by North Carolina appellate courts subse-
quent to the recognition of an implied warranty in Hartley demonstrate
commitment to broad application of the rule, the elements of the war-
or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the
injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is
deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought
reasonably to have been discovered by him whichever event first occurs; provided that in
such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving
rise to the claim for relief.
The new § 1-52(16), creating a three-year limitations period, contains nearly identical language,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
54. 38 N.C. App. at 208, 247 S.E.2d at 619.
55. This liberal approach should be contrasted with suggestions by several commentators
that a fixed limitations period should be imposed. See Bearman, supra note 8, at 576-78 (one year
statute of limitations proposed); Haskell, supra note 11, at 652 (five years). See also Matulunas v.
Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1978); Sedlmajer v. Jones, 275 N.W.2d 631 (S.D. 1979); Williams,
Developments in Actionsfor Breach of Implied Warranties of Habitability in the Sale of New
Houses, 10 TULSA L.J. 445, 448 (1975) (reasonableness).
56. 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
57. Id. at 191, 225 S.E.2d at 562.
58. Id. at 201, 225 S.E.2d at 567.
Thus, the jury could find the house was neither free from major structural defects nor
constructed in a workmanlike manner and that therefore it did not meet the prevailing
standard of workmanlike quality. Failure to meet this standard would constitute a
breach of the implied warranty regardless of whether the house could be deemed "liva-
ble."
Id.
59. Eg., Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 8 Ill. Dec. 271, 274, 365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977)
(implied warranty in sale of new home does not extend beyond the concept of habitability).
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ranty in North Carolina remain ressentially unchanged. Adherence to
these original elements6" unduly restricts the scope of the implied war-
ranty; if the judiciary is to take an active role in ensuring habitable
housing, warranty protection must be extended to subsequent purchas-
ers and disclaimers of the warranty prohibited. 6'
Expansion of the warranty of habitability to provide for these safe-
guards can equitably be accomplished by adoption of the following
three-tier protection package. First, under Hartley and its progeny, the
first purchaser of a home currently receives an implied warranty from
the builder-vendor 62 lasting not more than ten years63 that his home
and its integrally related fixtures have been built with workmanlike
construction. Second, any buyer who subsequently purchases the home
within the ten-year period should receive a similar guarantee from the
builder-vendor for the time remaining on the original ten-year war-
ranty period, though not less than one year.64 Thus, regardless of the
number of times a home is resold, each vendee who purchases the
home within its first ten years of use would be protected against undis-
closed defects of construction by the builder-vendor for either the time
remaining in the ten year period or one year, whichever is longer.
Third, after expiration of the ten-year period a home should be classi-
fied as a "used" home. The purchaser of a used home would receive a
one-year warranty of habitability from the owner-vendor6 5 of the home
for latent, undisclosed defects.66 Finally, a disclaimer of the warranty
should not be permitted unless it is clearly part of the bargain of sale in
both form and substance.67
60. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
61. See text accompanying note 110 infra.
62. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. For purposes of this discussion, a builder-
vendor includes a builder who sells, or hires another to sell, a home he constructed, and any
vendor who sells a home he had built for resale. This definition includes the professional sellers,
such as tract developers, but not mere brokers or real estate agents. The major consideration is
that liability be placed only on those who are in a position to control construction. Both the
builder and the vendor who has a home constructed for resale are in such a position. The pur-
chaser should be able to rely on their skill and depend on their guarantee of workmanlike con-
struction.
63. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 68-94 and accompanying text infra. The one-year minimum gives the pur-
chaser time to live in the home long enough to detect defects, even if less time is left in the original
ten-year warranty period.
65. Note that in the sale of a "used" home the original builder-vendor's liability has been
released. Instead, liability attaches to the owner of the home who is selling the structure. Thus,
the used home seller will be referred to as an "owner-vendor."
66. See notes 96-108 and accompanying text infra.
67. See notes 109-113 and accompanying text infra.
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North Carolina limits the implied warranty on new homes to "ini-
tial vendees,' ' 68 as does the case law in many other jurisdictions.69 This
position, however, is not the product of a reasoned analysis and is
probably based on the hesitancy of courts to initiate changes in an area
that has been long dormant. Because many structural defects are only
apparent with age or with a change in seasons,70 the warranty should
run with the land. A subsequent purchaser should not be denied war-
ranty coverage merely because he happened to purchase the home one
week or one year later than the original buyer. Nor should a builder-
vendor who constructs a defective home escape liability simply because
of the subsequent sale of that home by the initial vendee. With the
increasing mobility of the American public, it is reasonable to assume
that a builder-vendor has knowledge that his house might be resold
within a relatively short period of time. Given this assumption, a
builder-vendor should be expected to warrant his work beyond the first
purchase.
The argument in favor of extending the warranty to subsequent
purchasers is supported by case law and model statutory provisions. In
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc.,71 a case decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the purchasers of a mass-produ~ed home sued the
builder-vendor for injuries sustained by their child when a faucet dis-
pensed excessively hot water due to a latent defect in the mixing valve.
The parents were lessees of the original owner and recovered from the
builder despite lack of privity.72 The Schipper decision was cited with
approval by the California Supreme Court in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
Inc. ,3 an action by subsequent purchasers to recover damages for the
failure of a heating system. Although the Kriegler court did not reach
the issue of the warranty running with the sale of the home, it intimated
that the status of plaintiffs as subsequent purchasers would not bar
68. See 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
69. See, e.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Oliver v.
City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974); House v. Thornton, 76 Wisc. 2d 428,457 P.2d 199
(1969).
70. Note, Real Property--Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in New Housing Sales-'
New Protection for the North Carolina Homebuyer, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1090, 1093 (1975).
71. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
72. Schipper is unique in that the case proceeded on a strict liability theory predicated on a
breach of an implied warranty. Unlike the typical implied warranty case, which deals with breach
of contract in the sale of a home and recovery for economic loss resulting from that breach, Sch@v-
per sounded in tort and permitted recovery for a personal injury caused by breach of an implied
warranty.
73. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
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their action.74
Most clearly on point is Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 7" a case in-
volving subsequent purchasers who discovered a leaking basement and
cracked walls after buying the house from the original owners. The
court extended the builder-vendor's implied warranty of habitability76
to second or subsequent purchasers of the dwelling pointing out that
"the traditional requirement of privity between a builder-vendor and a
purchaser is an outmoded one."' 77 The court sought to protect the
builder-vendor from unwarranted liability by stressing the need for la-
tency of the defect and by making the home's age, maintenance and
prior use factors for consideration.78
The proposal to extend the warranty to subsequent purchasers also
finds support in the recently adopted Uniform Land Transactions Act
(ULTA).79 The ULTA includes an implied warranty of habitability,
defined in section 2-309.80 According to section 2-312, which states that
74. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 225-26, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The court acknowledged the continued
hesitation of other courts to extend warranty but, nevertheless, seemed prepared to make that step
themselves: "The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the
judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping legal principles abreast of the
times."
75. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976).
76. The Barnes court referred to the warranty as a requirement of "fitness for habitation."
Id. at 232, 342 N.E.2d at 622.
77. Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
78. Id. at 232, 342 N.E.2d at 622.
In addition to the case law cited in the text, a Florida court considered the inclusion of subse-
quent purchases, declaring:
The instant case deals with the first purchasers of condominium homes. We ponder,
but do not decide, what result would occur if more remote purchasers were involved.
We recognize that liability must have an end but question the creation of any artificial
limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser.
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
79. The Uniform Land Transactions Act, adopted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws on August 7, 1975, is found in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 46
(Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the ULTA and its warranty provisions, see Note, RealProp-
err- Warranties in the Uniforn Land Transactions Act of 1975--Progression or Retrogression for
Pennsylvania? 49 TEMPLE L. REV. 162 (1975).
80. ULTA § 2-309 provides, in pertinent part:
[IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QuALIT]
(a) Subject to the provisions on risk of loss (Section 2-406), a seller warrants that the real
estate will be in at least as good condition at the earlier of the time of the conveyance or
delivery of possession as it was on the date the contract was made, reasonable wear and
tear excepted.
(b) A seller, other than a lessor, in the business of selling real estate impliedly warrants
that the real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any
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a subsequent purchase carries with it an assignment of the seller's8
warranty rights to the buyer,12 the ULTA implied warranty is designed
to run with the land.83 Transfer of the warranty rights occurs notwith-
standing an agreement that only the immediate buyer has the benefits
of the warranties or that warranties received from a prior seller do not
improvements made or contracted for by him and completed no earlier than 2 years
before the date the contract to convey is made will be:
(1) free from defective materials; and
(2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound engineering
and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.
Subsection 2-309(b) of the ULTA imposes two warranties: one requiring that the structure be
constructed in accordance with accepted practices-a warranty of quality construction, and an-
other requiring that the property be suitable for ordinary uses of real estate of its type. Although
both warranties arise under § 2-309(b) of the Act, they are intended to apply to different types of
real estate. The warranty of quality construction guarantees that real estate is free from defective
materials and constructed in a workmanlike manner. It is intended to apply only to construction
made or contracted for by one who is "in the business of selling real estate," and applies only to
"new" construction, defined as improvements completed not earlier than two years before the
contract to convey was made.
The warranty of suitability is narrower than the warranty of construction, and imposes liabil-
ity for defects that would be deemed more serious than simply defective construction. For exam-
ple, the warranty applies broadly to all defects that render real estate unsuitable for its intended
use and, therefore, is similar to the warranty of habitability recognized in most jurisdictions. See
ULTA § 2-309(1), Commissioners' Comment 1.
There are significant differences, however, between the ULTA Warranty of suitability and
North Carolina's warranty of habitability. First, the warranty of suitability applies to all real
estate, not merely residential housing. Thus, buildings sold for commercial use are covered under
§ 2-309(b) while they clearly are not covered by the warranty of habitability in North Carolina,
Dawson Indus. v. Godley Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 270, 224 S.E.2d 266, cert. denied, 290 N.C.
551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976). Second, the warranty of suitability arises in the case of used, as well as
new, homes. See notes 96-108 and accompanying text infa. Third, the ULTA warranty applies
to improvements on existing real estate, a point that remains unsettled in North Carolina.
It should be noted, however, that a warranty of suitability seems to have been adopted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102
(1975), a case holding that land sold with a restrictive covenant be usable for the purpose to which
it was specifically limited by the covenant. See note 24 supra. Also note that both ULTA warran-
ties arise only against a person in the business of selling real estate, the nonprofessional seller
being liable only for express warranties made by him.
81. ULTA § 2-103(4) defines a seller as "a person who for value conveys or contracts to
convey real estate. A broker or an agent acting for disclosed person and not for his own account is
not a seller."
82. Id. § 2-103(2) defines a buyer as "a person who for value purchases or contracts to
purchase real estate. A broker or agent, acting for a disclosed person and not for his own account,
is not a buyer."
83. Id. § 2-312 provides, in pertinent part:
Section 2-312. (Third Party Benefciaries and ssignment of Warranty)
(a) A seller's warranty of title extends to the buyer's successors in title.
(b) Notwithstanding any agreement that only the immediate buyer has the benefit of
warranties of quality with respect to the real estate, or that warranties received from a
prior seller do not pass to the buyer, a conveyance of real estate transfers to the buyer all
warranties of quality made by prior sellers. However, any rights the seller has against a
prior seller for loss incurred before the conveyance may be reserved by the seller ex-
pressly or by implication from the circumstances.
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pass to the buyer.8 4
The ULTA does not, however, clearly state who should be consid-
ered the guarantor of the home when a subsequent purchaser brings a
warranty action. The implied warranty provided for by subsection 2-
309(b) of the Act operates only against a seller who is "in the business
of selling real estate."8 5 It is unclear if this limitation applies to subse-
quent transactions. The "run with the land" provision-section 2-
312-does not state specifically that the "seller" must be a person "in
the business." 86 Instead, every sale carries with it an assignment of the
seller's warranty rights against "prior parties. 87 Whether "prior par-
ties" must be "in the business of selling real estate" is ambiguous; but if
they do not, conceivably any seller of a home becomes a guarantor with
the sale. It seems, however, that in a subsequent sale the implied war-
ranty should run only from the original seller who was "in the busi-
ness" of selling homes and should not extend warranty liability to
homeowners or real estate brokers who are subsequent sellers. It is un-
likely that the Act would be read as imposing broader liability in a
subsequent purchase.88
If North Carolina were to extend new home warranty protection to
subsequent purchasers, it could follow the lead of the ULTA, but, it is
to be hoped, with less confusion. Either the judiciary or the legislature
could extend the Hartley warranty to all subsequent sales of a home
within the maximum statute of limitations period, which, pursuant to
the decision in Earls v. Link, Inc., is presently set at ten years.89 During
this period, any undisclosed latent defects that are found to constitute
breach of the warranty would give rise to a cause of action regardless of
how often the home previously changed hands. The gurantor of the
84. Id.
85. See id. § 2-309(b), quoted in note 80 supra.
86. See id. § 2-312(b), quoted in note 83 supra.
87. Id.; id. § 2-312, Commissioners' Comment 2.
88. Also note that, although the comments to § 2-309 do not attempt to state specific rules for
determining whether a particular seller is "in the business of sell real estate," the following general
guidelines are offered:
At the extremes the rules are clear: a homeowner selling his own home does not, by
reason of that sale, become a person in the business of selling real estate, but a tract
developer is clearly in the business. A real estate broker acting for another is not a seller
and does not, therefore, make the warranties imposed by this section. A seller who em-
ploys a broker or agent to make the sale or seeks buyers does not thereby become a
person in the business. Of course, if the seller would be a person in the business if he
were making the sale himself, he cannot avoid that result by selling through agents.
Id. § 2-309, Commissioners' Comment 1.
89. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text, supra.
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home during its first ten years would be the original builder-vendor, 90
with homeowners, brokers, and other nonbuilder-vendors who are sub-
sequent sellers excluded from liability.
As in Barnes, the builder-vendor could be protected by requiring a
finding of a latent defect and by consideration of such factors as the age
and prior use of the home. 91 Thus, for example, the cracking of paint
in an eight-year-old beach home may not be considered a breach of
warranty because one can reasonably expect such wear and tear in light
of the effect of salty air on paint, while severe flaws in the foundation
would not be expected and, therefore, should be covered by the war-
ranty. In addition, purchaser-caused defects could be excluded from
the builder-vendor's liability, as is the case in the sale of consumer
goods.92 Also, the statute of limitations effectively prevents endless lia-
bility for the seller. In fact, a builder-vendor would be exposed to no
more liability if his home was resold nine times during a ten-year pe-
riod than if the original purchaser resided in the house for ten years.
Finally, it is unreasonable to suggest that more defects, and thus more
litigation, would surface simply because more than one owner is
granted protection during the warranty period.9
While the extension of the warranty would not be unreasonably
harmful to the builder-vendor, its rewards to the homeowner are obvi-
ous, and furtherance of implied warranty objectives mandates its con-
sideration. Because the purpose of an implied warranty is to protect a
purchasers' expectations by holding builder-vendors accountable for
their work, protecting all home purchasers who buy during the war-
ranty period seems preferable to arbitrarily limiting protection to the
initial vendee. 94
90. For a definition of builder-vendor, see note 39 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
92. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 13.
93. Cf. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978) (court refused to
allow original builder to escape liability to subsequent purchasers by buying and reselling a home
he had constructed; no evidence of defects being caused by intervening purchases).
94. Further support for the extension of the warranty to subsequent purchasers can, surpris-
ingly enough, be found among builders themselves. The Home Owners Warranty Corporation, a
national builders association, has formulated a ten-year warranty-insurance plan that transfers to
subsequent purchasers within the ten-year period. See Note, Washington's New Home Implied
Warranty of Habitability-Explanatin and Model Statute, 54 WAsH. L. REV. 185, 201 (1968).
Law review writers have also been consistent in their support of an extension of warranty protec-
tion. See e.g., Comment, Real Property--Implied Warrantes-Sale of House by Builder- Vendor
Creates an Implied Warranty ofFitness and Habitabiity, 24 ALA. L. REv. 332, 337-38 (1972); Note,
note 70 supra, at 1093; Note, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitabiliy--Explana-
tion and Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REv. 185, 201 (1978).
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Under the proposed three-tier protection package, a home would
no longer be considered "new" for warranty purposes after the ten-year
warranty period ends, and the builder-vendor's liability would termi-
nate at that time. "Used" home purchasers, however, need protection
similar to that afforded those who purchase a home during the first ten
years of its life. Unfortunately, support for an expansion of the implied
warranty doctrine in this area can be found only in the ULTA95 and
among academicians. 96
Several courts that have rejected the extension to used housing
have focused on the factors that led to the initial recognition of the
warranty. These courts have found that, while a purchaser in the sale
of a new home relies on the skill of the builder-vendor, in the resale of
used housing this consideration is lacking because the vendor usually
has no greater skill than the buyer in determining the quality of a
house.97
This reasoning, however, ignores many other more important con-
siderations. First, although an "owner-vendor"98 may not possess
greater skill than the buyer in assessing a home's quality, he has no less
skill either. The significant difference between the two parties is that
the owner-vendor is in a superior position to be aware of defects. With
the initial formation of the implied warranty, courts essentially consid-
ered the relative positions of the builder-vendor and the purchaser and
placed the risk of defects on the builder-vendor, the party in thebest
position to prevent or discover them. The same analysis can be applied
in the sale of a used home by a owner-vendor. Between the owner-
vendor living in the house99 and the purchaser inspecting the home, the
burden of a loss should not fall on the buyer, the party least likely to
discover a defect before the sale.10°
Second, a purchaser of a used home still expects reasonable qual-
95. ULTA § 2-309, Commissioners' Comment 1.
96. Haskell, supra note 11, at 652.
97. See e.g., Sousa v. Albino, 338 A.2d 804 805 (R.I. 1978); Annot., 25 A.L.L 3d 383, 413-19
(1969).
98. See note 65 supra for the definition of "owner-vendor.'
99. A "professional" used home seller could be treated differently than the normal home-
owner seeking to sell his or her home. The distinction might be made along the lines of the
merchant/nonmerchant dichotomy used in U.S.C. § 2-314 (implied warranty in the sale of goods).
For example, a nonprofessional seller's liability might be limited to cases in which actual fraud or,
at least, seller's knowledge of the defect could be proven, but a "professional" seller's liability
would be based on the usual implied warranty.
100. See Haskell, supra note 11, at 651.
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ity and a structure free from major defects in workmanship.' 10 Al-
though a used home buyer does not expect his structure to be in the
same condition as a new home, he, nevertheless, expects it to be suit-
able for use as a residence. Moreover, with the sharp appreciation of
home values, a purchaser of a ten-year old residence usually pays more
for that home than did its original owner. As with extension of the new
home warranty to subsequent purchasers, wear and tear should be rele-
vant in the finding of a breach.10 2 For example, a leaking roof may
constitute a breach in the sale of an eleven-year-old house but not in
one that is twenty-five-years old. Also, even the seller of an eleven-
year-old house should be held responsible only if the defect is latent
and undisclosed.
Finally, public policy considerations are present. If habitable
housing is to be assured, it is inconsistent to ignore defects that render a
home unlivable simply because a home is more than ten years old.
In addition to the reluctance of courts to recognize the need for a
used home warranty, there is the difficulty of identifying the guarantor
of such a warranty. Clearly, the remoteness of the builder-vendor pre-
cludes his liability. 10 3 The sale is often negotiated by a broker, but it
would be unreasonable to hold him liable because he has no control
over the construction or maintenance of the home. This leaves the
owner of the home, most likely the person closest to the transaction, as
the only reasonable guarantor."l '
The owner-vendor, by entering into a sale, certainly recognizes
that the purchase price reflects an expectation that the home is habita-
ble. He is, as previously discussed, in a superior position to be aware of
any defects and should not have a license to pass them on to an unsus-
pecting buyer. Under the proposed warranties for initial and subse-
quent purchasers, the homeowner would have up to ten years and no
less than one year to seek recourse against the builder-vendor for defec-
tive construction. 5 If he fails to take advantage of these warranty
privileges, he should not be permitted to avoid the loss resulting from a
defect by passing it on to an unsuspecting third party after the new
home warranty period has expired.
Placing liability for the sale of a defective used home on the own-
101. Id. at 649-50.
102. See text accompanying 74 supra.
103. See Corburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977).
104. See Weber v. Mathews, 367 So. 2d 1326, 1328 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
105. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
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er-vendor is obviously a tremendous expansion of the implied warranty
of habitability as it presently exists in North Carolina. One author has
suggested that if there is some hesitation about placing the entire loss
on a used home seller, who may have been innocent in the transaction,
the damages could be split by permitting the purchaser only one-half of
his normal award. 106 Although unconventional, the proposal appears a
rational means of settling a dispute between innocent parties, so long as
courts do not become bogged down in assessing culpability.
Finally, there is the problem of determining limits to the action.
As previously noted, the scope of the warranty can be limited to non-
disclosed, latent defects and the loss can be divided among the parties.
In addition, a short statute of limitations could be applied to permit the
owner-vendor repose from litigation. Since the housing is "used" and
the major protection offered by the ten-year "new" home warranty has
already been exhausted, a statute of limitations of one year should be
sufficient. This would give the purchaser time to discover latent de-
fects, without overburdening the seller of a used home.
With the addition of a used home implied warranty, every sale of a
house would carry with it some protection. With the first sale, the ini-
tial vendee already has an implied warranty guaranteed by the builder-
vendor that the home is free from defective workmanship for a period
of up to ten years. Any sale made by the initial vendee or subsequent
purchasers during this ten-year period would carry with it the warranty
guaranteed by the builder-vendor for the time remaining in the period
or one year, whichever is greater.10 7 After the ten-year period has been
exhausted, the home would be considered a used dwelling, with the
owner-vendor impliedly warranting for one year that the home is suit-
able for use as a residence.108 This extension of implied warranty con-
cepts provides across-the-board protection for homeowners and ensures
habitable housing. At the same time, strict limitations on the applica-
tion of the warranty would permit the seller reasonable protection of
his interests in the transaction. Although the protection of homebuyers
is clearly diminished by permitting the disclaimer of warranties, a ma-
jority of courts addressing the question have concluded that the implied
warranty of habitability may be disclaimed. 10 9 In Grffin v. Wheeler-
106. Haskell, supra note 11, at 653.
107. See notes 62-63 & 68-94 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 96-106 and accompanying text supra.
109. See, ag., Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, 925 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); Crowder v.
Vanderdeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978). See generally Haskell, supra note 11, at 653-54.
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Leonard & Co.,110 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
The implied warranty here under consideration, applicable to a
dwelling sold by a builder, arises by operation of law, not by a spe-
cific factual agreement between the parties. Without question, how-
ever, a builder-vendor and a purchaser could enter into a binding
agreement that such implied warranty would not apply to their par-
ticular transaction.
• . . Such an exclusion, if desired by the parties to a contract for the
purchase of a residence, should be accomplished by clear, unambigu-
ous language, reflecting the fact that the parties fully intended such
result. ' I
This position ignores substantial policy considerations." 12 The decline
of caveat emptor was partially due to a recognition that the vendor and
vendee were not possessed of equal bargaining power. This inequality
is no less a concern when a disclaimer clause is inserted in a contract
for the sale of a home. The policy of providing habitable housing re-
gardless of the status of the purchaser is frustrated by contracts that
permit a builder to shift the burden for economic loss resulting from
latent defects to the purchaser. It is incongruous to permit public pol-
icy to be emasculated by often unconscionable private contracts. As
Professor Haskell states,
A forceful argument can also be made for the supposition that
any disclaimer of fitness for habitation in the sale of new construction
is unconscionable and against public policy. Should a merchant be
permitted to build and receive money for a structure which appears
to be a house-and avoid liability in the event the structure has a
material defect?" 3
To protect these concerns, North Carolina should be more restric-
tive in its disclaimer policy. If disclaimers of warranties in new housing
are to be permitted at all, a purchaser should be protected by more than
the Grin safeguard of clearly expressed intention. As further protec-
tion, the North Carolina courts should require that the implied war-
ranty of habitability be specifically disclaimed rather than included in a
general disclaimer of warranties and that such a disclaimer be reflected
in the purchase price. 1 4 This would prevent builders from using their
110. 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
111. Id. at 202, 225 S.E.2d at 567-68.
112. See Note, Washington'r New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanaion and
Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REv. 185, 214-16 (1978).
113. Haskell, supra note 11, at 654.
114. An analogy can be made to the North Carolina law regarding equity of redemption waiv-
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superior bargaining position to the detriment of an ignorant purchaser,
and the policy of providing habitable housing at a price insulated from
latent defects would be maintained. The same considerations do not
exist with regard to used housing, and a disclaimer in that area would
be less objectionable. A clear disclaimer in the sale of a used home
would most likely reflect both parties' expectations rather than discrep-
ancies in bargaining position.
With the Hartley court's recognition of an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of new homes, North Carolina significantly im-
proved the outmoded concepts that dominated: the sale of real estate
and motivated an adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor. That
recognition, however, should only be a starting point. In order to fur-
ther the policy considerations of habitability and workmanlike con-
struction promulgated in Hartley, the North Carolina courts must go
further than simply construing implied warranty concepts liberally. In-
stead, the fundamental policies could better be implemented by exten-
sion of new home warranty protection to subsequent purchasers,
recognition of a warranty in the sale of used housing and a restrictive
policy discouraging the operation of disclaimer clauses. Through these
changes, the ghost of caveat emptor can be forever exorcised, and en-
lightened policy considerations can begin to ensure adequate protection
for all the homeowners of North Carolina.
PETER WAYNE SCHNEIDER
ers. Such a waiver by the mortgagor to the mortgagee is presumed fraudulent; however, the mort-
gagee may rebut this presumption by proving that:
(1) the mortgagor transferred the equity of redemption at his own initiative;
(2) the transfer was for new and adequate consideration; and,
(3) the mortgagee did not use its power or position to drive an unfair bargain.
See Alford v. Moore, 161 N.C. 382, 386, 77 S.E. 343, 344 (1913).
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